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öst arbete som förhoppningsvis kommer att nå 
en bred läsekrets då boken kan läsas ur många 
olika synvinklar: konsthistoriska, litteraturhis-
toriska, kulturhistoriska lika väl som en studie 
av förbindelser, reella eller idealiserade, mellan 
verklighet, porträttkonst och litteratur, mel-
lan Sverige och Frankrike, mellan Sverige och 
Orienten under 1700-talet.
Johanna Ilmakunnas
Øyvind Gjems Fjeldbu, Éducation et images men-
tales dans l’Émile de Jean-Jacques Rousseau: étude d’un 
modèle cognitif et rhétorique (Trondheim: Faculté 
des lettres, Université des sciences et techni-
ques de Norvège, 2011). 251 pp.
Øyvind Gjems Fjeldbu aims in this thesis to 
reconstruct a series of core claims in Rous-
seau’s Émile (which serves as the orienting 
work under discussion, although the author 
appeals to other writings of Rousseau’s as 
well, except for the surprising absence of the 
Nouvelle Héloïse from everywhere but a footnote 
– admittedly, Fjeldbu focused on precisely this 
text in a 2007 paper, ‘L’expression complexe de 
l’amitié dans Julie ou la Nouvelle Héloïse’), focus-
ing on the interplay between moral and cogni-
tive development in Rousseau’s thought.
It is clear and well written, if repetitious 
(partly due to the academic form it seeks to 
adopt), in surprisingly good French (aside 
from occasional errors), but key terms are of-
ten used without being deﬁned (particularly 
‘épistémologie’), and there does not seem to 
be any effort to articulate a transition between 
chapters. Some of the usage seems old-fash-
ioned, such as consistently referring to the 
nationality of authors cited (‘the Portuguese 
scientist’, ‘the French critic’, ‘the Norwegian 
scholar’, etc.). 
But the intellectual content is ambitious 
and well-structured although the core claim 
– concerning the relation between ideas, im-
ages, and moral conscience in a developmental 
perspective which gives ‘affectivity ’ a key role 
– is never well deﬁned. I shall clarify some of 
these critical suggestions and then focus on 
this interesting central claim.
Fjeldbu sometimes calls his own approach 
a ‘perspective cognitive’ (p. 45); he claims 
that Rousseau granted ‘the heart and the mor-
al conscience, a cognitive function’ (p. 49); 
that he was a ‘precursor’ of affective neuro-
science (in the ﬁrst page of the Introduction); 
sometimes Rousseau (in the Émile) ‘announces 
some aspects of modern psychology’ (p. 190). 
Fjeldbu gestures to Damasio’s ‘affective neu-
roscience’, which has stressed the irreduc-
ible role of emotions in cognition, an idea 
Damasio attributes originally to Spinoza (For 
a short sketch of how to construct a relation 
between Spinoza and ‘affective neuroscience’, 
more philosophically subtle than Damasio’s 
own work, see Heidi M. Ravven, ‘Spinozis-
tic Approaches to Evolutionary Naturalism: 
Spinoza’s Anticipation of Contemporary Af-
fective Neuroscience’, Politics and the Life Sciences 
22:1 (2003), pp. 70–74). The idea here is 
that Rousseau’s way of bringing sentiments 
and reason, ‘heart and mind’, closer together 
is somehow an anticipation of current theo-
ries of cognition, speciﬁcally ‘affective neuro-
science’: ‘This proximity [between heart and 
mind] seems to indicate a cognitive model in 
which the affective movements of the heart are 
interwoven with rational operations, a cogni-
tive model which appears quite advanced if we 
take into account the ideas put forth by Anto-
nio Damasio’ (p. 70).
It is not apparent whether the author’s 
project is primarily to apply a contemporary 
theory of cognition (and affects) to Rousseau, 
or to use a careful analysis of eighteenth-cen-
tury texts to theorize affectivity differently, or, 
lastly, a third option which would be a com-
plex combination of the two (as in work which 
claims to present a ‘Humean’ or ‘Spinozist’ 
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moral philosophy today)? He does say that 
contemporary cognitive concepts have to be 
understood within the context of eighteenth-
century psychology. 
Fjeldbu deﬁnitely provides a careful, rath-
er conservative body of textual analysis in the 
thesis, which means that of the three afore-
mentioned options, the second is the most 
likely, and in the Conclusion he speaks of how 
the ‘dynamism of Rousseau’s thought enables 
it to be open to new perspectives’ (p. 238) 
– but except for some suggestions in the early 
sections of the work, there is not much en-
gagement at all with contemporary cognitive 
theory. And in any case, there is a problem 
with Fjeldbu’s way of presenting his usage 
of Damasio as somehow equivalent to locat-
ing Rousseau within contemporary cognitive 
science: Damasio’s work (rather strangely de-
scribed as ‘strictly biological’, p. 12) is in no 
way considered mainstream or representative, 
and has been widely criticized as well. There 
are actually three problems here: ﬁrstly, that 
the connection between Rousseau’s thought 
and these contemporary theories is not suf-
ﬁciently articulated; secondly, that these theo-
ries make much more sense when articulated 
with Hume or Spinoza for example – notably 
because, unlike these thinkers, Rousseau is not 
a naturalist about the mind in any recogniz-
able sense. Thirdly, even if Rousseau were a 
‘Damasian avant la lettre’, this would not make 
Fjeldbu’s perspective ‘cognitive’ or ‘cognitiv-
ist’ in any general, understandable sense.
To be clear, there is no reason not to ar-
ticulate an analysis in which Rousseau is read 
in light of some of Damasio’s ideas; but one 
should be clear about the standing and the 
context of the respective components of the 
analysis. If the heart in Rousseau means ‘eve-
rything that is right, natural and in conformity 
with human nature’ (p. 156), this seems pretty 
far removed from affectivity in contemporary 
cognitive science, even with the addition of 
rather opaque references to the heart’s ‘biolog-
ic-axiological function’ in Rousseau (p. 170). 
Similarly, to claim that there is a Rousseauean 
materialism – a possible claim, to be sure, but 
one relying on a very idiosyncratic conception 
of a ‘matérialisme du sage’, in which freedom 
and moral sentiments predominate – and then 
to extrapolate from there that this ‘possible 
materialism in Rousseau opens onto the bio-
logicism which is at the basis of modern cog-
nitive psychology’ (p. 19) is a big jump!
In this sense, Fjeldbu’s methodology – not 
the ﬂow of textual analysis, nor the general 
claims about how Rousseau deals with cog-
nition, mental images, or the developmen-
tal process of moving from ‘naturalism’ (in 
Émile’s childhood) to moral conscience and 
full intellectual cognition (interlinked in his 
adulthood), but the rulebook of how theory, 
scholarship and textual analysis come together 
– is never stated or well deﬁned. If he wants 
to say that a certain current trend in cognitive 
science helps us understand Rousseau, that is 
one thing; if the (more dated and problem-
atic) claim is that Rousseau is a ‘precursor’ of 
affective neuroscience, that should be clearly 
stated as well. There are other possibilities, of 
course, à la Yves Citton’s L’Envers de la Liberté 
(2006) or Lynn Tribble’s Cognition in the Globe 
(2011). And it might have been interesting 
to relate this approach to what some theo-
rists have recently called ‘historical cognitive 
science’, which in John Sutton’s terms works 
between two projects. One is ‘the analysis of 
other and older theories of mind, of how they 
relate to and differ from current approaches, 
and of what forgotten or neglected explananda 
they bring into focus’. The other, ‘relating to 
cognitive practices rather than theories’, is 
‘the task of working out how such views about 
mind and self reﬂect or partly cause different 
historical forms of mental activity.’ (John Sut-
ton, ‘Body, Mind, and Order’, in 1543 and all 
that (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000.) 
Conversely, Fjeldbu does not attend much 
to the question of what Rousseau wants in this 
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context. That is, if Hume, Rousseau, and 
Damasio all claim that we should not ignore 
the role of the passions, or sentiments, or af-
fects in the constitution of thought, reason, 
cognition, morals, and so on, that does not 
mean they all do so for the same reason, and 
that their claims are interchangeable. Nor is it 
obvious that Rousseau wants to develop ‘une 
nouvelle épistémologie’, even if he pays a lot 
of attention to mental processes, the senses, 
and the role of the emotions both in cognition 
overall and in moral cognition in particular.
To dwell on the case of Hume for a mo-
ment: one might have expected a bit more dis-
cussion of the similarities between Hume and 
Rousseau on the basic themes of the thesis, 
including in biographical terms. Did Hume 
inﬂuence Rousseau here? Fjeldbu insists that 
Rousseau, the theorist of ‘raison sensitive’, 
overcomes the classical opposition between 
reason and the passions, as is apparent in the 
Bildungsroman Émile, sometimes in the name 
of a ‘new kind of reason’, sometimes because 
man, ‘even reasonable man’, is viewed as obey-
ing ‘sentiment’ rather than reason (Fjeldbu 
approvingly citing Dérathé, 79n.): it is sur-
prising to see no reference at all to Hume, for 
whom reason famously is, ‘and ought only be 
the slave of the passions’ (Treatise on Human 
Nature, II.iii.3); Hume also describes reason 
as ‘nothing but a wonderful and unintelligi-
ble instinct’ (ibid., I.iii.16.9). When Rousseau, 
speaking as Émile’s ‘governor’, declares that 
‘we can only control the passions by means 
of the passions; it is through their power that 
we can combat their tyranny’ (cit. Fjeldbu, p. 
205), or, similarly, in the Discourse on the Origins 
of Inequality, states that ‘whatever the Moralists 
declare, the human understanding owes a great 
deal to the passions’ (cit. Fjeldbu, p. 236), he 
sounds just like Hume. 
Other historical connections that are men-
tioned for a few lines but not explored (even a 
paragraph could do the trick!) include Diderot 
and Condillac. Condillac’s inﬂuence is some-
times mentioned, but Fjeldbu does not seem 
to see the striking parallel between Rousseau’s 
description of his methodology in progressive-
ly constructing Émile (‘I took the approach of 
positing an imaginary pupil, of granting his 
sage, health, knowledge … of leading [his 
education] from the time of his birth to when 
he has become a man and needs no other guide 
than himself ’ (Émile ou de l’éducation, in Rous-
seau, Œuvres complètes, eds. Bernard Gagnebin 
and Marcel Raymond, vol. IV (Paris: Galli-
mard-Pléiade, 1969, reprint 1990), pp. 264–
265 (hereafter OC), cit. Fjeldbu, p. 90) and 
Condillac’s famous thought-experiment of the 
statue in his 1754 Traité des sensations.
Not mentioned at all is that other Geneva 
philosopher, Charles Bonnet, who has a fair bit 
to say about cognition, personal development, 
and selfhood – but maybe his work is too late 
to have inﬂuenced Rousseau. Fjeldbu is good 
on the debate between Rousseau and Helvétius 
on the nature of ideas and the role of the sens-
es, which helps to situate Rousseau as both a 
kind of empiricist – albeit a ‘sentimental em-
piricist’, in Jessica Riskin’s phrase in Science in 
the Age of Sensibility (2002) –, and a critic of 
materialism, most powerfully in the ‘Profes-
sion de foi du vicaire savoyard’ in Émile.
A much more complex case, and one which 
is frequently mentioned by Fjeldbu, is that of 
Descartes, or at least ‘Cartesianism’, speciﬁ-
cally Cartesian dualism. He suggests several 
times that Rousseau is inspired by Cartesian-
ism (p. 13) or that he defends Cartesian dual-
ism (pp. 19, 190, 237), but Rousseau surely 
is not a metaphysical substance dualist. And 
of course Fjeldbu’s core claim concerning 
the role of mental imagery and affectivity (or 
‘sentiment’) in mental life runs quite strongly 
against any Cartesian conceptions. A more in-
teresting contrast would have been between 
Rousseau and the newer ‘embodied’ vision of 
Descartes as the author of the Traité de l’Homme 
and the Passions de l’âme (and the correspond-
ence with Elizabeth), rather than the textbook 
143
Descartes of the substance dualism defended 
in the Discours and the Méditations. But the em-
bodied Descartes was not the one primarily 
discussed in the Enlightenment. 
Sometimes Fjeldbu’s reliance on second-
ary sources for strong claims can lead him 
astray. It is surprising to read that eighteenth-
century psychology was Cartesian (pp. 13, 15; 
the names of Locke, Hume, Wolff, and Kant 
come to mind as exceptions). Just because one 
author cited by Fjeldbu declares in a 1979 pa-
per that Rousseau’s philosophical position in 
the Émile is ‘an attempted synthesis of Carte-
sian dualism and the sensationalist theory of 
knowledge’ (Bloch, cit. Fjeldbu, p. 18), this 
does not make such a claim true, certainly not 
without much further textual and contextual 
substantiation. (Similarly, because one paper 
claims that Locke’s theory of the mind is ‘spa-
tial’, to go on to declare that inasmuch as Rous-
seau has a spatial representation of the mind, 
he belongs to a Lockean tradition (p. 129) is a 
bit unsupported, and seems strange.) 
Fjeldbu’s major idea, which is perhaps also 
the most original element here (not being a 
Rousseau specialist I reserve judgement on 
this), is that of a ‘developmental viewpoint’ 
in which the Bildungsroman Émile is itself a de-
velopmental account of epistemology, from 
naturalism (suitable for the child) to morals 
(appropriate to the adult). This is a theory of 
how the mind grows, but also of the forma-
tion of speciﬁcally moral cognition. It is in this 
context that Fjeldbu deals with Rousseau’s 
relation to both empiricism (including ‘sen-
sationism’ as an epistemology) and material-
ism. As O’Neal puts it (quoted by Fjeldbu), 
‘In developing his theories on education … 
Rousseau ﬁrst grants fundamental importance 
to the senses’; it is here that he aligns him-
self with his century more than in any other 
area. And Rousseau gives explicit empiricist 
grounding to his idea of ‘raison sensitive’, as 
a primary mechanism of association of ideas 
derived from sense; thus the project of Émile’s 
education is to ‘mold’ or ‘sculpt’ this ‘sensitive 
reason’ into a moral-cognitive whole at a high-
er level of development (p. 235). And indeed, 
Rousseau can sound just like an empiricist at 
times: ‘Our sensibility is undeniably prior to 
our intelligence; we have sentiments before we 
have ideas’; ‘Man is modiﬁed by his sense, no 
one doubts that; … we tend to underestimate 
the role of sensations; we do not see that they 
affect us not just as sensations but as signs 
or images’ (Émile, in OC IV, p. 600; Essai sur 
l’origine des langues, OC V, p. 412).
However, Rousseau is not a ‘naïve empiri-
cist’ in the sense that he holds that the mind 
already has, to some degree, an internal struc-
ture (if not content); Fjeldbu, citing Jean-
François Perrin, uses the phrase matrice structur-
ante, a ‘structuring matrix’ (p. 35). Rousseau 
also distinguishes between a sensibility which 
is purely corporeal or natural, and a moral or 
spiritual sensibility; the former is more pas-
sive and associated with childhood, the latter 
more active and associated with adulthood (p. 
169n.). Further, even if he does think there are 
innate ideas, he does think there are innate sen-
timents. And in many respects, including when 
articulating Émile’s development towards pos-
sessing a moral conscience, he presents this as 
part of an intellectual refutation of material-
ism, even if he sometimes claims that ‘all dis-
putes between idealists and materialists mean 
nothing to me’ (Émile, in OC IV, p. 571, cit. 
Fjeldbu, p. 17n).
And here the idea of Rousseau’s idiosyn-
cratic materialism (a materialism of affects 
and morals rather than of matter or nature) 
has some connection to affectivity, but Fjeld-
bu does not spell it out enough. A key idea 
is that Rousseau transposes the metaphysical 
problem of dualism and materialism into the 
context of the moral development of Émile; 
‘epistemologies’ become stages of moral and 
cognitive development, so that basic materi-
alism could be ‘true’ of Émile as a child, as 
he is still primarily part of a world governed 
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strictly by physical laws, but as the education 
progresses and he develops a moral conscience, 
it becomes less and less true (pp. 67–69, 76, 
96, 143, 146, 190, 204). Part of Rousseau’s 
original or idiosyncratic dualism is the claim 
that the distinction between mind and body, 
while it may pose metaphysical problems, is in 
fact a condition for our happiness. Here he is 
both somewhat like Hume (for whom passions 
are ‘original existences’ not to be reduced to 
matter in general) and also like a traditional 
moralist, emphasizing the importance of self-
denial (e.g. with respect to sexual pleasure). 
Crucially, as stated with regard to Émile’s de-
velopment, for moral principles to take root 
in the student’s ‘heart’, he has to ‘love’ and 
‘feel’ them, rather than just apprehend them 
intellectually: as Rousseau puts it in a differ-
ent context (the role of sense-impressions, in 
the Dialogues included in Rousseau juge de Jean-
Jacques), if ‘impressions do not penetrate his 
heart, they are null and void’ (OC I, 1959, p. 
808, cit. Fjeldbu, p. 66). Rousseau, as Fjeldbu 
nicely analyses, stresses the role of the ‘heart’, 
of ‘sentiment’ as more foundational than in-
tellect: ‘Even if all philosophers proved me 
wrong, if you felt I was right, that would be 
enough for me’ (Émile, in OC IV, p. 599).
In sum, with this thesis we have a careful 
and systematic textual analysis of Rousseau’s 
Émile, focusing on the development of a kind 
of moral cognition as a concept which is nei-
ther materialist nor idealist, neither Cartesian 
nor empiricist, and which grants signiﬁcant 
explanatory power both to the role of images 
in mental life (‘all my ideas are in images’, Con-
fessions, cit. Fjeldbu, p. 142) and to rhetoric as 
an educational and developmental device. The 
parts of the argument which appeal to contem-
porary debates in cognitive science (whether 
on imagery or the role of emotions) are not so 
well handled; it would also have been helpful 
to have a better discussion of Rousseau in his 
own intellectual context – whether the Hutch-
eson-Hume line of the development of ‘moral 
sense’, moral passions, and sympathy (as com-
pared to Rousseauean pity), or eighteenth-
century psychological ideas, or the parts of 
the French Enlightenment closest to Rousseau 
(rather than relying on some commonplaces). 
The reader familiar with Rousseau will ﬁnd 
some interesting pistes de lecture; the reader more 
accustomed to intellectual history, philosophy 
or ‘HPS’ (history and philosophy of science) 
will enjoy some of the Rousseau passages but 
remain a bit puzzled as to the overall project.
Charles T. Wolfe
Magnus Linnarsson, Postgång på växlande vill-
kor: det svenska postväsendets organisation under stor-
maktstiden, Södertörn doctoral dissertations 49 
(Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2010). 281 s.
Magnus Linnarssons (tidigare Magnus Olsson) 
avhandling handlar om det svenska postverkets 
organisering under perioden 1600–1720. Av-
handlingen berör organisationsformen, huru-
vida postverket skulle vara centraliserat eller 
arrenderat, och ligger därmed nära Mats Hal-
lenbergs studie av skatteuppbörden på 1600-
talet, Statsmakt till salu (2008). Bägge förfat-
tarna är inspirerade av transaktionskostnader 
som förklarande begrepp, och för Linnarsson 
innebär det att postverket omväxlande lagts ut 
på ”entreprenad” och styrts enligt principen 
om ”hierarki”.
Källmaterialet utgörs främst av kungliga 
förordningar om det formella regelverket för 
postens organisation, och material ur kansli-
kollegiets och överpostmästarens arkiv, samt 
kompletterande material från riksdagen och 
från Axel Oxenstiernas korrespondens. Av-
handlingens struktur grundas, med undan-
tag för första och sista kapitlen, på perioder: 
Först om postbefordran före och i samband 
med postverkets bildande 1636; därefter pe-
rioden 1643–1673 då Johan Beijer, Vilhelm 
